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The Current Need For A New Candid
Legal Standard Recognizing Broad
Corporate Social Responsibility
RODMAN M. ELFIN*
THE PRESENT MANIFESTATION OF THE PROBLEM
The pressures are becoming intense for the recognition of social re-
sponsibility as a legal standard to guide business, and for a consequent
rejection of profit maximization as the sole legal standard of business
guidance. The situation exists because of the tremendous power of our
large corporations and the impact of the use, or lack of use, of such
power upon our society.
Currently this pressure exists in three significant areas. First, busi-
ness managers of university and other trust funds are being urged to
divest their funds of shares of stock in corporations with substantial
activity in South Africa and Namibia because those countries have ra-
cial policies which are contrary to the moral and ethical beliefs of stu-
dents and other activists. Thus, divestiture is urged solely to advance a
social cause, despite the fact that such action may result in expense and
a lowering of income to the trust. By way of example, Harvard recently
* The author received his B.S. in Business Administration from Syracuse University, and
his J.D. and LL.M. (in corporation law) from New York University. He is a member of the New
Jersey Bar, and practiced there before teaching at Fairleigh Dickinson University and Cardozo
Law School, Yeshiva University. He has published in the American Business Law Journal, the
Intramural Law Review ofNew York University, and the Syracuse Law Review. He is a reviewer
for the American Business Law Journal and the Business Law Review. At present he is an Assistant
Professor of Business Law at Washington State University.
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announced that it opposed divestiture not merely, or even primarily,
because it costs the university money, but because Harvard believes
that, contrary to the position of the social activists, divestiture is a "rel-
atively ineffective means of pursuing ethical ends."' Nevertheless, it
would consider "divestiture in the case of a corporation that offered no
hope of changing its behavior in South Africa to meet its ethical re-
sponsibilities."' In Ohio, Miami University trustees voted to sell the
university's stock in Union Carbide Corporation, and the Warner-
Lambert Company, because they have operations in South Africa.
This was in response to a resolution for divestiture proposed by a stu-
dent-faculty "Committee Against Apartheid" and approved in a stu-
dent referendum In May 1978 students demonstrating against
investments in South Africa staged a sit-in at the graduate school of
business at Columbia University. On the same day, a university Senate
committee announced its recommendations on the issue "including
proposals for divestiture of stock in companies that demonstrate 'indif-
ference to oppressive racial policies.' "I The University of Washington
adopted a new investment policy "that allows consideration of human
rights concerns in addition to its primary objective of getting maximum
return at minimum risk."5 Divestiture is being debated at many other
universities, including the Universities of Massachusetts and Wiscon-
sin, Princeton, and Stanford.
With respect to the management of their portfolios, as opposed to
their educational activities, university trustees share the same objectives
and have the same responsibilities as profit-seeking corporations. They
recognize the legal as well as the business and social issues involved.
Harvard's portfolio includes $300 million in companies with business
connections in South Africa. In April 1979 Harvard's President Derek
Bok referred to the legal problems facing portfolio managers who buy
and sell on political rather than financial grounds. He said that "[t]otal
divestment would almost certainly cause the university to divert mil-
lions of dollars in pursuit of a strategy that is legally questiona-
ble. . ." A recent editorial in the New York Times reported that by
avoiding or unloading such holdings, a university might well risk mil-
lions in income and corporate gifts.7 The Times editorial states: "The
imperfect answer for these trustees is that they have to draw the line by
1. The Chronicle of Higher Education, May 8, 1978, at 9, col. 1, 2.
2. Id
3. Id. at 9, col. 2.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 9, col. 3.
6. TIME, April 16, 1979, at 104, col. 3.
7. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1978, at 18E, cols. 1-4.
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their own evolving standards of social responsibility, with due regard
for deeply-held convictions in their communities."'
Secondly, in the spring of 1978, President Carter asked management
and labor for voluntary price and wage restraint in order to combat
inflation. American Telephone and Telegraph, for example, responded
with an announcement of a freeze on the price of phone equipment.
The business, social, and political climate is typified by a New York
Times editorial which states in part: "[I]f enough key companies com-
ply with the call for voluntary restraint, a genuine dent might be made
in the inflation rate. . . . [T]he old ways of courting inflation have
performed badly; a new way would be welcome."9
In June 1978, responding to the same need, "Bethlehem, the nation's
second largest steelmaker, announced that it would scale back an antic-
ipated 7% price increase, set for July, to a flat 3%. Moreover, the com-
pany pledged to forego any additional price hikes this year, if the
President's anti-inflation strategy of voluntary cooperation from indus-
try and labor begins to slow the alarming spiral in the cost of living."'10
Presidential assistant Robert Strauss "promptly hailed Bethlehem's ac-
tion as a 'major breakthrough' and an example of 'good corporate citi-
zenship.' ",i Kaiser Aluminum and Ford Motor Company have also
put a lid on prices.' 2
Thirdly, on a more ongoing basis, there are the substantial forces
that play on businesses and on business people, both in their capacity
as corporate executives and as individuals, in an attempt to solve long
range social problems such as pollution control and widespread malnu-
trition. Legal standards for pollution control are arrived at, in large
part, as a result of compromise between environmentalists and profit-
oriented business. To view the formation of the standards and their
application as strictly the result of two diametrically opposed interests
is, however, simplistic. A segment, at least of top management, being
informed, interested, and moral persons, as well as efficient business
managers, are concerned with the environment in a positive sense; and
are desirous of improving that environment beyond the point of merely
complying with legal standards, often established by compromise, with
interests that place greater emphasis on profits.
A specific example of the attitude of many modern business execu-
8. Id.
9. Id., May 28, 1978, at 14E, cols. 3, 4.
10. TIME, June 26, 1978, at 50, col. I (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 50, col 1.
12. Id.
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tives is that of Thomas Wyman, President of Green Giant Company, a
food processor with sales approaching $500 million.
An outspoken executive, he often rebukes business for high-polluting
plants, unsafe products, underfunded pensions, and overseas bribes.
Despite such visible failings, he argues, there is far more talent in
business than in politics, and therefore business should do much to
solve global problems, including malnutrition. This is both the right
and the smart thing to do, he reasons, and business should be willing
to accept less than its usual profit, since Third World pressures will
disrupt Western economies if hunger continues.
13
The related question of who should pay for corporate altruism was
highlighted in July 1978, when the Washington Utilities and Transpor-
tation Commission was urged to scrap a policy under which it allows
utilities to include charitable contributions in the base used to set con-
sumer rates. The Commission accounting analyst challenged the inclu-
sion of $479,000 in charitable contributions in the rate base of Pacific
Northwest Bell. The Commission analyst's contention is that if charita-
ble contributions are charged as an operating expense, the ratepayer is
forced to pay higher rates but with no ratepayer benefits and with no
opportunity to determine the recipients of the amounts for which the
ratepayer is charged. The Commission set the charitable contribution
policy in 1976 in Bell's previous rate increase request and in another
order granting General Telephone Company a rate boost. In those or-
ders, the Commission pictured Bell as responsible corporate neighbors
throughout the state of Washington, and said "all businesses are ex-
pected to contribute to social and charitable programs."' 4 The Com-
mission also remarked that the lack of contributions would be strongly
felt in smaller communities around the state. Editorial treatment, the
day after this announcement, took the position that building this ex-
pense into the rate structure was a serious wrong, and that Pacific
Northwest Bell should not be able to make its customers pay for its
charitable contributions. The company, on the other hand, claims that
other businesses make contributions of various kinds which they in-
clude in the price of their goods.' 5 The question here is whether the
customers or the shareholders should bear the expense of these charita-
ble contributions,16 and, potentially, should the contribution be made
at all.
13. Id. at 51, col. 2.
14. Lewiston Morning Tribune, July 20, 1978, at 2C, col. 4.
15. Id., July 21, 1978, at 4A, col. 1.
16. It is interesting that this is still an active question. In 1934, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma considered this very question and held that a gas company was not entitled to an
increase in its gas rate to enable it to make donations or contributions to charitable or civic causes.
Carey v. Corporation Comm'n, 168 Okla. 487, 33 P.2d 799 (1934).
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In all three of these areas the legal question is the same. There is a
growing recognition that the problems of our society cannot be solved
by government alone. Business is involved in the solution of social and
political problems, and this involvement requires a decision to use cor-
porate funds, or to reduce profits, in order to attain social or political
aims. Despite this development in corporate activity, a difference exists
between corporate practice and generally recognized corporate law.
Historically, profit maximization for the benefit of the shareholder has
been the standard applied by the law. The question raised by the in-
volvement of business in these pressing social issues is: to what extent
may management use corporate funds, or forego profits, in order to
achieve what it conceives to be its social responsibility, in view of the
conflicting right of shareholders to receive maximum dividends?
Intellectually, the question is not new. Professor E. Merrick Dodd
raised the basic issue of the social responsibility of business in 1932.17
In 1961, Justice Frankfurter noted in a dissenting opinion that "a con-
tested question in the corporate field is the legitimacy of corporate
charitable contributions."' 8 In substantial part, the contribution to
organized charity has been dealt with by legislation, but that legislation
has not resolved the larger issue of general corporate social responsibil-
ity raised above.
THE DEVELOPMENT, STATUS, AND PREDICTED FUTURE OF
PERMISSIBLE CORPORATE ALTRUISM
Because of the current social pressures noted above, it is at this time
necessary to examine the development of the law and the present status
of legal authority for corporate action in the field of business social
responsibility. It is necessary, also, to anticipate the future develop-
ment of the law so that a framework will exist for the resolution of
those questions raised above, as well as similar questions in such fields
as urban problems, poverty, and race relations, with which business is
becoming increasingly involved.
The development of the law in this area has been hindered by the
natural tendency of businesspeople, regardless of what may be an altru-
istic motive for their social behavior, to justify their action on the basis
of at least long-term profit potential. Thus, they are often able to avoid
the legal question of compliance with the standard of profit maximiza-
tion. The issue is further complicated by the fact that, in reality, corpo-
17. Dodd, For Whom 4re Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1932).
18. International Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 815 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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rate judgment may be based on several elements, some altruistic and
some profit oriented.
What has been described as corporate "good citizenship" and real
concern for the solution of broad social problems, with respect to the
large corporation at least, often merges with and becomes indistin-
guishable from a concept of long-term profit potential. Thus, a corpo-
ration can contend with logic that its ability to operate profitably is
affected by the social and political, as well as the economic, environ-
ment in which it operates. In fact, the initial short-term advantage to
the corporation which employs all of its resources for profit maximiza-
tion may be lost, in the form of good will, to the corporation which
recognizes that the kind of society necessary to sustain profits must be
nurtured by the kind of activity which can often be called either long-
term profit orientation or altruism. Also, when the public expects busi-
ness to assume social responsibility, this becomes a factor related to
good will that a profit-oriented business executive must consider.
The starting point in a discussion of the legal parameters of a corpo-
ration in relation to expenditure of funds not related to profit max-
imization is the landmark case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. I9 Henry
Ford, the dominant shareholder, announced that in large part the busi-
ness would henceforth be devoted to the reduction of prices to the con-
sumer and to expansion so that more jobs would be provided for
workers. It was Ford's intention to spread the benefit of our industrial
system by increasing employment, and to reduce dividends in order to
discharge a public obligation to keep prices down. This was character-
ized as a humanitarian motive. Ford's purpose was altruistic. The
Michigan Supreme Court compelled Ford to continue, instead, to pay
large dividends. The court stated:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the shareholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of the directors is to be exercised
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondis-
tribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.2 °
The Dodge decision would seem to foreclose the possibility of altruistic
activities by corporate managers. The philosophy of that decision is
simply stated by Fletcher:
A gift of its property by a corporation not created for charitable pur-
poses is in violation of the rights of stockholders and is ultra vires
19. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668, 3 A.L.R. 413 (1919).
20. Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684, 3 A.L.R. 413, 441 (1919).
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however worthy of encouragement or aid the object of the gift may
be.2
1
All of the states have treated the traditional philanthrophic contribu-
tion by some form of statutory authorization which empowers the mak-
ing of specified contributions. These statutes authorize certain
altruistic activities apart from the benefit rule. Most of the states have
modeled their statute after section 4(m) of the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act. The 1969 Text as amended to 1977 provides under the
heading "General Powers": "Each corporation shall have power: . . .
(in) To make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scien-
tific or educational purposes." The Model Act does not attempt to re-
strict the amount or source of a donation. Two states22 authorize only
those donations which are "reasonable," and three states2 3 limit dona-
tions to the percentage of taxable income which a corporation may de-
duct under federal income tax law. Most of the states use the words
"charitable, educational, scientific, and public welfare." A lesser but
substantial number use the word "religious," and a still lesser but sig-
nificant number use the word "civic." A sprinkling of other words are
used by a few states such as "artistic," "hospital," "literary," "patri-
otic," "philantrophic," "welfare," and "benevolent." Two states 4 use
the words "social and economic betterment."
To the extent therefore that an expenditure of corporate funds, which
has its root in a desire to discharge "social responsibility," falls within
the traditional classification of "charitable, educational, scientific, pub-
lic welfare," or other specific terminology noted above, there is express
statutory authorization. When, however, we approach the use of or loss
of funds for such purposes as affecting racial discrimination in South
Africa, voluntary price restraint to combat inflation, pollution control
beyond legislative requirements, or correcting malnutrition in Third
World countries, as well as other pressing social problems, these activi-
ties cannot be easily fitted into the usual statutory classifications. Clos-
est in point, of course, is the wording "public welfare" used in most but
not all states, and "betterment of social and economic conditions" used
in two states. There is little authority defining these words. One court,
considering a statute similar to the Model Act, and where the recipient
of the gift was characterized as possibly a "pet charity," held that the
21. Cyclopedia of Corporations, Perm. Ed. §2939 at 667. See also Annot., 3 A.L.R.
443(1919).
22. MD. COi'. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §2-103; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §1.19 (West).
23. IND. CODE ANN. §23-1-2-17 (Bums); S.C. CODE ANN. §33-3-20; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§108.
24. NEB. REV. STAT. §21-2004; N.J. STAT. ANN. §14A:3-4 (West). Note that the New Jersey
statute using this language was adopted in 1969, after the decision in .4.P. Smith lanufacturing
Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
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test to be applied is one of reasonableness.25
Because government has in recent times sought the active participa-
tion of business to cure social ills, the 1969 version of the Model Act
added section 4(n), which empowers corporations "[t]o transact any
lawful business which the board of directors shall find will be in aid of
governmental policy." As this is adopted by state legislatures, the crea-
tion or confirmation of the power of a corporation to act "in aid of
governmental policy," without finding such power in common law, will
go far to legitimize many corporate activities in the social sphere. It
will not help, however, in those instances where corporate social action
cannot be shown to follow a predetermined governmental policy. As a
matter of fact, the adoption of section 4(n) may by implication serve to
limit lawful corporate social action to those instances where govern-
ment has first established a policy. Corporations may therefore be pre-
vented from leading the way into areas of social need. It would be
unfortunate if our society solidified into a system where large reposito-
ries of power and wealth, our public corporations, could not on their
own initiative select programs and aims deemed socially desirable.
A lingering question is the effect of the statutes that legalize specific
corporate activity upon corporate social activity that cannot reasonably
be included in the specific categories set forth in the statutes. Should
such statutes be construed to invalidate by implication social activity
not specifically authorized by the statute, but that would have been per-
missible under common law? Such a view is certainly arguable. An
equally valid contention is that the statutes are intended to confirm the
validity of certain corporate activity, without making invalid what
would be permissible under common law. No authority has been
found specifically addressed to this point.
The evolution of social thinking over the period 1919 to 1953
culminated in recognition by the Supreme Court of New Jersey of cor-
porate responsibility to the community as the legal justification for a
contribution to Princeton University, without reliance upon a statute
and without reliance upon a showing of benefit to the donor. In A._P.
Smith Manufacturing Company v. Barlow,26 although the court could
have sustained the contribution on narrow grounds, it did so in the
context of social responsibility. The court stated that "modern condi-
tions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as
well as private responsibilities as members of the communities in which
they operate.27
25. Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969).
26. 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
27. Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
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The corporation first attempted to bring the contribution within the
economic benefit test by showing that the contribution was designed to
enhance the corporation's good will, and to assure a flow of trained
personnel for corporate employment, and to bolster free enterprise
through education. The court emphasized that it is required to take
notice of changed circumstances which require adjustment of our legal
doctrines, and stated that charitable institutions have become depen-
dent on corporate giving as more and more wealth has been concen-
trated in corporations. The court found that the contribution could be
justified under the common law benefit test by stretching benefit to in-
clude long-term survival in a free enterprise system. The benefit re-
quired under the common law test was found in the relationship
between the gift to higher education and its effect on the educational
system and the very survival of the corporation in a free enterprise sys-
tem. It must be noted that this claimed benefit is not in fact related to
increase in business revenues or to cost reduction, except perhaps in a
most remote sense. It can be termed a legal fiction. More importantly,
ho we Per, the courtfound that thepower of corporations to make contribu-
tions existed apart from express statutory conditions.2 s
Union PacYc Railroad Co. v. Trustees Inc.,9 a 1958 case, involved a
contribution not authorized by the corporate charter. The Supreme
Court of Utah justified its holding that there was implied power to
make the contribution on the ground that corporations in modem soci-
ety are the repositories of the wealth that is available to support, for
example, educational, charitable, or religious institutions, and that in
response there has been born a new corporate business policy. This
policy involves the use of funds for worthy causes just as other funds
are earmarked for advertising or public relations. The Chairman of the
Board of Union Pacific Railroad Company testified: "I think the pub-
lic has come to expect that we will support worthwhile local and na-
tional causes, and in effect we agree with this viewpoint."3 The court,
after going out of its way to sustain the gift on the grounds noted
above, also considered that it was for the best interests of the company
and its shareholders. The language of the dissent is particularly signifi-
cant as it recognizes the ultimate truth of much corporate activity in the
social sphere. The dissent stated:
The main opinion suggests that the directors of appellant are "confi-
dent that their company presently and directly, or within the foresee-
able future would receive a quid pro quo as the resultant of good will
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. 8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958).
30. Id. at 106, 329 P.2d at 401.
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engendered by contributions." In my opinion it is impossible to declare
that good will of any size or dimension or any good will whatsoever will
result from the giving. In my opinion the real purpose, of these public
spirited directors, is their desire to aid worthwhile causes that need their
assistance. 31
Sylvia Martin Foundations Inc. v. Swearingen32 involved a decision
by Standard Oil of Indiana to float a bond offering overseas rather than
in the United States. The decision required the corporation to pay a
higher interest rate on its bonds than would have been required if the
bonds were floated in the United States. Standard Oil made the deci-
sion in order to aid a severe United States balance of payments prob-
lem. The suit was dismissed on procedural issues. However, the court
noted that the decision to aid the United States' balance of payments
problem could be sustained as a matter of business judgment. Note
that the loss of funds here goes far beyond the usual definition of chari-
table contribution.
In Shlensky v. Wrigley,33 a minority shareholder of the Chicago Cubs
baseball team challenged the corporation's refusal to install lights at the
stadium and schedule night games, which apparently would have in-
creased profits. The corporation took this action because it believed
that baseball is a daytime sport and that "the installation of lights and
night baseball games will have a deteriorating effect upon the surrounding
neighborhood."34 Relief was denied. The court found that the corpo-
ration's decision could have been based on a concern that deterioration
of the neighborhood would reduce patronage and not be in the long-
run interest of the corporation.
In Kelly v. Bel, 36 the Supreme Court of Delaware sustained a "dona-
tion" made by U.S. Steel Corporation to Pennsylvania County. This
donation was allegedly made in recognition of the corporation's re-
sponsibility to the community and, the court found, in its self interest.
The court spoke in terms of benefit to the corporation, as well as in
terms of the corporation's social responsibility. Considering the facts of
the case, it is apparent that the court could have justified its decision
solely on the benefit theory. It is significant, therefore, that the court
relied in addition on A.P. Smith v. Barlow37 and validated the pay-
ments as part of United States Steel's social responsibility.
A common thread which winds through the cases decided since
31. Id at 111-12, 329 P.2d at 405 (emphasis added).
32. 260 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
33. 95 IMI. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1978).
34. Id. at 176, 237 N.E.2d at 778 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 180, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
36. 254 A.2d 62 (Del. Ch. 1969), aj'd, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1970).
37. 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
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Dodge v. FordMotor Co. is that businessmen engage in, and the courts
sustain, altruistic activity, but both businessmen and the courts feel
constrained to justify the action as being of economic benefit to the
corporation. It is interesting to note that few modem cases have actu-
ally held corporate officers or directors liable for ultra vires acts. A few
cases have granted injunctions to shareholders to restrain contemplated
ultra vires acts.38 Since the 1930's no court has actually invalidated
corporate expenditures not related to profit except for political activi-
ties that were prohibited by statute. On the contrary, each test has re-
sulted in affirmance of the corporate action, regardless of the grounds
stated by the court.
Undoubtedly, due to the uncertainty of the law, judicial opinions on
the subject speak in terms both of social responsibility and benefit. It is
difficult to determine, therefore, whether the cases justify altruistic cor-
porate expenditures under the benefit rule, or in spite of it. Because of
the steady extension of the concept of benefit, it seems that any corpo-
rate act that benefits society is said to benefit the corporation and its
shareholders. A greater latitude of course exists for corporate social
expenditures in those states that permit donations for "public welfare"
than in those which permit only the more traditional expenditures for
"charitable, scientific or educational purposes." In either case, the ac-
tivities permitted are in great need of clarification.
The concern of business with respect to authority for altruistic be-
havior was verbalized by John S. Sinclair, a director of the Union Pa-
cific Railroad Company:
Because of the fear that if under common law no direct return can be
shown, a dissenting stockholder may successfully charge the directors
with giving away money that does not belong to them, legal counsel
prefers to have legislative support for making contributions.. .. 39
Where directors in fact pursue altruistic activities for the benefit of so-
ciety, instead of seeking to maximize profits, and this course of action is
frequently sustained, it is no longer possible to use candidly the direc-
tor's traditional fiduciary duty to shareholders as the test of permissible
corporate activity.
In one area at least, it has become clear that a corporation may spend
money even though the expenditure will not have a material effect on
its business. This area was considered by the United States Supreme
Court in 1978 in the case of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.40
The case is concerned with the first amendment and freedom of speech.
38. See, e.g., Aiple v. Twin City Barge and Towing Co., 274 Minn. 38, 143 N.W.2d 374
(1966); Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
39. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 112, 329 P.2d 398, 405 (1958).
40. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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The appellants, national banking associations and business corpora-
tions, wanted to spend money to publicize their views opposing a refer-
endum proposal to amend the Massachusetts constitution to authorize
the legislature to enact a graduated personal income tax. The action
was brought challenging the constitutionality of a Massachusetts crimi-
nal statute that prohibited them from making contributions or expendi-
tures for the purpose of influencing or affecting the vote on any
question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting
any of the property, business or assets of the corporation. The statute
specified that "no question submitted to the voters solely concerning
the taxation of the income, property or transactions of individuals shall
be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the
corporation."'4 1 The court held that there is no support in the first or
fourteenth amendments or in Supreme Court decisions for the proposi-
tion that such speech loses the protection otherwise afforded it by the
first amendment, simply because its source is a corporation that cannot
prove, to a court's satisfaction, that it has a material effect on the corpo-
ration's business.42 Neither, the court held, could the statute be justi-
fied on the asserted ground that it protects the rights of shareholders
whose views differ from those expressed by management on behalf of
the corporation.43 The Supreme Court stated that the issue presented
was one of first impression.
The statute, held unconstitutional, permitted a corporation to com-
municate to the public its views on certain referenda subjects-those
materially affecting its business-but not others. It also singles out one
kind of ballot question-individual taxation-as a subject about which
corporations may never make their ideas public. The statute drew the
line between permissible and impermissible speech according to
whether there is a sufficient nexus, as defined by the legislature, be-
tween the issue presented to the voters and the business interests of the
speaker.44 The court stated:
If a legislature may direct business corporations to "stick to business"
it also may limit other corporations-religious, charitable, or civic-
to their respective "business" when addressing the public. Such
power in government to channel the expression of views is unaccept-
able under the First Amendment.
4 1
Mr. Justice White stated in the dissent that "the issue is whether a State
may prevent corporate management from using the corporate treasury
41. Id. at 768; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, §8.
42. 435 U.S. at 784.
43. Id. at 790-92.
44. Id. at 784.
45. Id. at 785.
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to propagate views having no connection with the corporate busi-
ness."46 Justice White concluded that the majority opinion was in error
by stating that:
The Court invalidates the Massachusetts statute and holds that the
First Amendment guarantees corporate managers the right to use not
only their personal funds, but also those of the corporation, to circu-
late fact and opinion irrelevant to the business placed in their charge
and necessarily representing their own personal or collective views about
political and social questions. . ..'
Mr. Justice White sums up the impact of the majority opinion by stat-
ing:
As I understand the view that has now become part of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, the use of corporate funds, even for causes irrel-
evant to the corporation's business, may be no more limited than that
of individual funds.48
Further language in the dissent is significant because it represents the
older views rejected by the majority.49
The expenditure of funds to influence votes not related to the corpo-
ration's business was approved by the Bellotti court in spite of the fact
that there was "no basis whatsoever for concluding that these views are
expressive of the heterogenous beliefs of their shareholders."50 Are
these shareholders without a remedy? The Supreme Court addressed
that question and found they do have a remedy.
Ultimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of cor-
porate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in de-
bate on public issues. Acting through their power to elect the board
of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the corpora-
46. Id. at 803 (White, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 821.
49. Shareholders in such entities do not share a common set of political or social views,
and they certainly have not invested their money for the purpose of advancing political
or social causes. .... In fact, as discussed infra, the government has a strong interest in
assuring that investment decisions are not predicated upon agreement or disagreement
with the activities of corporations in the political arena.
Id. at 805 (White, J., dissenting).
In short, corporate management may not use corporate monies to promote what does not
further corporate affairs but in the last analysis are the purely personal views of the
management, individually or as a group.
Id. at 813 (White, J., dissenting).
Corporations, as previously noted, are created by the State as a means of furthering the
public welfare. One of their functions is to determine, by their success in obtaining
funds, the uses to which society's resources are to be put. A State may legitimately con-
clude that corporations would not serve as economically efficient vehicles for such deci-
sions if the investment preferences of the public were significantly affected by their
ideological or political activities. It has long been recognized that such pursuits are not
the proper business of corporations. The common law was generally interpreted as
prohibiting corporate political participation.
Id. at 818-19 (White, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 806 (White, J., dissenting).
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tion's charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to pro-
tect their own interest.
Further, the court stated: "[The shareholder invests in a corporation
of his own volition and is free to withdraw his investment at any time
and for any reason."51
In the context of the first amendment, the Supreme Court advanced
another argument which has force equal to the broader issues with
which we are concerned. If the test of materially affecting the corpo-
rate business was allowed to stand, "management never could be sure
whether a court would disagree with its judgment as to the effect upon
the corporation's business of a particular referendum issue."52 This is
especially so "when what must be established is a complex and amor-
phous economic relationship."53 In like manner, corporations as we
have seen may be unduly hesitant to engage in advantageous social
activity when management can never be sure that a court will agree
that there is a sufficient nexus to a business purpose.
Until the 1978 decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
case of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the law of corporate
social responsibility developed independently of the first amendment.
The impact of this first amendment case upon the law of corporate so-
cial responsibility, however, is clear. A state may not prevent corporate
management from using corporate funds to propagate views having no
connection with the corporate business. The first amendment guaran-
tees corporate managers the right to use corporate funds to circulate
fact and opinion irrelevant to the business placed in their charge and
representing their own personal views about political and social ques-
tions. Once having established this point, and given the pressures that
exist to permit the use of such funds to advance social causes generally,
there is little reason to confine the doctrine to use of funds to influence
a vote. From the standpoint of the shareholder who claims these same
funds as his own, there is no difference between the use of the funds to
effect a vote on a social issue and the use of the same funds to execute a
social policy. This argument has persuasive force, but the question of
corporate expenditure for a purpose not related to its business and
made to accomplish a social cause directl rather than an expenditure
made to convince others to vote in favor of that cause would have to be
addressed expressly before the rule of law with which this article is
concerned could be considered clear. The reasons for this decision,
grounded in the first amendment, are different than those previously
51. Id. at 794-95 n.34.
52. Id. at 785 n.21.
53. Id.
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encountered in the field of corporate social responsibility. However,
the close relationship that exists in fields of social activity between the
activity itself and shaping public opinion relating to that activity,
means that the impact of this decision should be enormous upon per-
missible corporate social activity.
The cases noted since the Ford case have chipped away at the doc-
trine therein expressed. Bellotti, through the medium of the first
amendment, takes a giant step forward. It could be narrowly con-
strued, but it may afford the thrust that is needed at this time to estab-
lish a broad new standard.
To the extent indicated and qualified above, permission for corpo-
rate altruism presently exists. The traditional requirement of benefit to
the corporation in order to validate a corporate expenditure is rooted in
large part upon the advantage this test has with reference to accounta-
bility. A test which consists of the sole pursuit of shareholder interests,
except where otherwise specifically authorized by statute, is easily ap-
plied when short term benefit is involved. On the other hand, almost
any expenditure can be justified as being of long-term benefit to a cor-
poration when the argument is advanced that a good social, economic,
and political climate is a positive factor in the long-term success of a
business. In reality, it often becomes impossible to distinguish between
an expenditure which has as its purpose a desire to aid what the corpo-
ration believes to be a worthwhile cause, and has no other purpose, and
an expenditure which has as its purpose long-term benefit to a corpora-
tion justified on the basis that a good social, economic, and political
climate is a positive factor in the long-term success of a business. In
reality, these two principles merge. In order to avoid litigation and lia-
bility, it is common for corporate executives to use the protection of the
long-term benefit theory to validate what is really an altruistic motive,
and such altruistic motives often exist. As stated by Mr. Harriman,
Chairman of the Board of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and
noted in Union Pacfc Railroad Co. v. Trustees, Inc.:
We have also come to the conclusion there is a general public ac-
ceptance of the idea that corporations should act like public-spirited
citizens and cannot seek always to put the gift on a quid pro quo
basis.5 4
It is submitted that a legal standard that does not meet the test of
reality and intellectual honesty should be discarded in favor of one that
does. The development of the law in the field of corporate social re-
sponsibility is reminiscent of the development of the law towards the
54. 8 Utah 2d at 112, 329 P.2d at 405.
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theory of strict liability. In order to obtain a socially desirable result in
products liability cases, the courts for many years permitted recovery
for breach of warranty without privity of contract. This was a prag-
matic but intellectually dishonest approach. Eventually the courts, re-
alizing that the reasoning used to achieve the result was strained,
recognized recovery on the basis of a new theory, strict tort liability.55
Chief Justice Burger stated in June, 1979 "[B]eware the 'good results'
achieved by judicially unauthorized or intellectually dishonest
means ... "56 Altrustic social activity, often sustained on the ground
of long term benefit and often claimed by management to be of long-
term benefit to the corporation in order to avoid the legal question of
its validity, should be sustained instead by an honest recognition of a
new standard.
THE CONCEPT OF ACCOUNTABILITY
If the profit motive is rejected as the sole guiding principle for corpo-
rate action and social betterment is considered an additional guide, the
traditional legal notions of management's fiduciary obligation to its
shareholders must be altered. If the system of controls based upon
profit maximization alone is discarded, consideration must be given to
what the new controls will be.
It is certainly difficult to quantify the effect upon a corporation of
behavior that may be categorized as altrustic or as undertaken in view
of a long-range profit potential. But this is not a novel situation. It is
no easier to quantify the effect of many research and development or
advertising programs. Undoubtedly, the addition of social responsibil-
ity to the functions of management would increase the difficulty of
evaluating management's performance. We would no longer have a
mathematical test, profit, by which to judge management. This has
been advanced as a serious objection to the inclusion of corporate so-
cial responsibility as a legitimate additional goal of management. The
problem is a formidable one, but given the need for change, and the
extent of pressure for a change, it need not be unsolvable. A diffusion
of managerial responsibilities would not result in arbitrary decision-
making but would reflect decisionmaking that is responsive to wider
expectations of shareholders, customers, and others, probably exactly
in relation to the force that diverse elements are able to bring upon the
corporation and the market price of the stock.
There should be no substantial fear of a wholesale diversion of cor-
55. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 11. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964).
56. See the dissent of Chief Justice Burger in UnitedSteelworkers v. Brian F Weber, 99 S. Ct.
2721, 2736 (1979).
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porate assets for social purposes to the detriment of profits. In addition
to the internal procedures that exist for change of corporate manage-
ment where corporate action runs consistently contrary to the desires of
shareholders, there is the effect of shareholders' displeasure upon the
market price of the stock. If corporate involvement in the social sphere
results in lesser earnings, or otherwise reaches the point where share-
holders become dissatisfied, sale of the stock and resultant market pres-
sure would reduce the price of the stock. This would normally be
unacceptable to management, both because management would be-
come vulnerable to replacement by internal means and because a lower
stock market price would make management vulnerable to a takeover.
Other factors that will cause management to concentrate heavily on
profits, even if social obligations were made a legitimate additional cor-
porate goal are, one, that poor market performance of the stock will
make it more difficult to obtain capital both through sale of new securi-
ties and through bank loans; and two, that failure of the stock price to
rise will prevent management from realizing hoped-for gain from stock
options.
On the other hand, it is unlikely to expect a selling wave in a profita-
ble company, despite involvement in social problems. Thus, if profit is
not the only test for permissible corporate expenditures, a healthy bal-
ance is likely to result between expendtures designed to produce profit
and expenditures designed to produce social good. The exact balance
should reflect the views of society and of shareholders and managers
who are members of that society as to the relative importance of each
factor. As to the interplay of forces, it should not be forgotten that
shareholders increasingly represent a cross-section of American life,
and the views of shareholders are often more aligned with the interests
of the general public than of the corporation. The possibily near-per-
fect action of the market will reflect the degree of positive interest of
shareholders and prospective buyers of stock in the social performance
of the corporation. It is only when their collective judgment is negative
that the stock price will decline.
A change in the legal test of management's function, for another rea-
son, would not result in quite the radical change in our economy that
some may predict. At the present time, the commercial importance of
all levels of government to business, and the vast actual and potential
governmental regulatory power over business, makes government ap-
proval dependent upon adherence to governmental policy and objec-
tives of major significance to business. Modem management also
knows that it runs the risk of serious consequences if it adopts policies
that important social groups consider to be adverse to their, or to the
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general public's, interest. To the extent that management is presently
sensitive to governmental policy and social issues, the recognition of a
legal standard that would permit action based thereon would legitimize
rather than change the present operation of our economic system.
Accountability would be enhanced by requiring two safeguards.
First, if corporate altruism is to be controlled by the effect of share-
holder disapproval, then formal action by the board of directors that
would feel the effect of disapproval, should be required for any expen-
diture that involves a significant percentage of corporate assets. Lesser
sums could be approved by corporate officers alone. The particular
percentage could be established by statute, but preferably, in view of
the varied factors that may exist in individual cases, this could be left to
judicial determination. Secondly, the effectiveness of shareholder dis-
approval would be served by Securities and Exchange Commission
regulations requiring disclosure of corporate altruism. This public dis-
closure would tend to limit abuses of discretion while not stifling bene-
ficial programs. Public disclosure, and the attendant public as well as
intercompany discussion that would result, would tend to develop a
consensus approach to corporate altruistic activity. This recognizes
that people operate subject to both legal and social control that is be-
yond the enforcing mechanism of the legal system.
The social performance disclosure question is receiving the attention
of the accounting profession. There is a recognition of the need to de-
velop methods of measuring, assessing, and controlling the social per-
formance of private enterprise with respect to issues such as
environmental protection, racial and sexual discrimination, and con-
sumer policies. This involves theories, criteria, and methodologies to
measure and report on aspects of corporate social performance. The
incentive for this endeavor is a view among investors that a moderate
to strong association exists between the investment value of a com-
pany's shares and its social performance. A study by Professor Barry
Spicer reported in January, 197817 notes an increase in the number of
investors who
on the basis of moral or ethical predilections (or because of pressure
from various sources), believe they should avoid investing in certain
classes of corporations, i.e., those that are thought to be causing so-
cial injury or environmental damage of one type or another.
58
This includes a large number of influential institutional investors. The
study notes the establishment of "clean mutual funds, the investment
57. Spicer, Investors Corporate Social Performance and Information Disclosure.- An Empirical
Study, THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW, January, 1978, at 94. Barry H. Spicer is an Assistant Professor
of Accounting at the University of Oregon.
58. Id. at 96.
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objectives of which explicitly include social objectives or criteria." 9
The concept of merger between pure altruism and long-term profit,
previously noted, is here reinforced with the statement, "a long-term
economic perspective necessarily involves some social considerations,
since a company with egregious pollution or employment problems is
likely to bear economic consequences at a future date."6° Professor
Spicer concludes that
any complete measure of corporate social performance would re-
quire (1) the specification of those factors or components that can
properly be said to be a part of a corporation's social performance;
(2) the measurement of performance with respect to each of these
factors or components; and (3) the summarization of these measures
into a vector of indices or one overall index of some type.
6 1
For his study Professor Spicer chose corporation records with respect to
pollution control. As a result of his empirical investigation, Professor
Spicer concluded that
[s]ome statistically significant associations were shown to exist be-
tween corporations' pollution-control records (as defined in the
study) and a number of other financial or economic variables of in-
terest. Specifically, it was found that, for a sample drawn from the
pulp and paper industry, companies with better pollution-control
records tend to have higher profitability, larger size, lower total risk,
lower systematic risk and higher price/earnings ratios than compa-
nies with poorer pollution-control records.
62
Two particularly significant points are evident in Professor Spicer's
work. First, the fact that a corporation's performance in the social
sphere is shown to have a positive relationship to the value of its shares
and its profitability bolsters the contention here made that in fact there
is often a merger between altruism and profit motivation, and that it is
unrealistic to attempt to apply a legal standard which ignores altruism
as a justifiable motive for corporate expenditures. Secondly, with re-
spect to the problem of directors' accountability for the corporation's
social activity, the accounting profession is engaged in beginning to for-
mulate techniques to measure that performance. Professor Spicer
states that this "foreshadows both a fundamental change in disclosure




60. B. LONGSTRETH AND H. ROSENBLOOM, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 62-63 (1973).
61. Spicer, Investors, Corporate SocialPerformance andInformation Disclosure: An Empirical
Study, THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 
January 1978, at 98.
62. Id. at 109.
63. Id. at 95.
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In the transition from a rule of profit maximization to a rule which
allows, additionally, expenditures to advance social ends not related to
profit, we should not be overly concerned that we have moved from an
objective test to one not capable of strict application. However objec-
tive the profit maximization test may appear, it has never been suscepti-
ble of strict application. It cannot be determined if profit has been
really maximized. It has never been anything more than a goal. Rea-
sonable men do differ about the results of an action taken in the name
of profit maximization. Reasonable men will differ about the propriety
and results of action taken in the name of social benefit. Neither test
can do more, in the context of imperfect knowledge, than to provide a
theoretical framework within which to bring judgment to bear.
THE NEW REALITY REQUIRES THE RECOGNITION OF A NEW
STANDARD
It has traditionally been argued that society has created institutions
such as government and charitable organizations to assume the respon-
sibility of administering to social needs. This theory worked well in the
early years of our economic developnent and before the emergence of
the modern corporate giants. Business involvement in social issues and
the pressure of society and of special interest groups for greater in-
volvement impliedly rejects this traditional division of responsibility.
Business involvement in the social sphere is being demanded by stu-
dents, environmentalists, consumer advocates, groups concerned with
inflation, unemployment, poverty, and the numerous other social issues
of our time. As a result, fundamental questions have been raised about
the structure of our society. These voices will not be stilled by a re-
sponse that the business of business is profit, and business will not be
permitted to survive in its old form. It is not naive, but realistic, to take
account of the world we are now living in, and formally legitimize cor-
porate social acitivity that does exist now and must exist in the future to
a greater extent.
When a large segment of society views shareholders as no longer be-
ing the only group for whose benefit a corporation must act, but as only
one interest group, and demands that management must promote the
interests of society as well, then a significant change has taken place in
the reality of corporations. Corporate altruistic action has reached, or
evidently at least may shortly reach, such proportions that the straining
of existing legal norms becomes inadequate for the guidance of busi-
ness. Realistic legal standards must evolve to match what is really hap-
pening.
Much corporate action is susceptible to interpretation either as altru-
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istic or profit oriented. Corporate action in aid of governmental policy,
for example, an agreement not to raise prices in order to counter infla-
tion, even if done for its avowed purpose (i.e., actually altruistic) can be
defended on the ground of narrow corporate benefit, thus com-
pounding the difficulty of determining motive. Large corporations are
vulnerable to governmental pressure because of the threat of antitrust
and other unwanted regulation. When such pressure is brought to
bear, either explicitly or subtly, management can argue that the action
is justified under the benefit test, because failure to accede to the pres-
sure may result in serious adverse effects through future legislation, ad-
ministrative action or more vigorous enforcement of existing laws.
This argument is real, but it can also be used to justify purely altruistic
activity under the benefit test if management wishes to so cover itself
under older and more predictable legal theory. Where the intention is
to perform altruistic activity, it should not be made necessary, and is in
fact dishonest, to present the activity as if it were profit oriented.
The test of profit maximization is convenient. One of its most posi-
tive attributes has been that it affords managers protection from liabil-
ity if they observe it. It is a safe rule for a businessperson to follow.
We should not, however, continue to subscribe to the test of profit max-
imization merely because it is an easy test, if in fact the test no longer
truthfully fulfills the needs of society. We should not indulge in legal
fiction to defend a reasonable, socially desirable policy that the public
demands.
It is, of course, a first concern of management that its capital be used
profitably, or there would shortly be no capital. At some point beyond
that, the entity to whom society has entrusted its major resources must
be responsive to the larger needs of society. The role of business, the
efficient use of resources to produce the maximum benefit for society, is
only meaningful if it includes by definition both the social and eco-
nomic benefits. From the strictly selfish standpoint of the business
community, it must be recognized that unless the possessors of society's
major resources take up the challenge of society's problems, society will
not forever tolerate the continued entrustment of society's resources to
private enterprise. Ever increasing elements of our society now require
that the repositories of wealth and power directly address the responsi-
bilities which are deemed to be inherent in the possession of such
wealth and power. Significant segments of management agree.
No attempt is made here to minimize the profit motive as the chief
force behind our economic system. Yet to claim that it is the only force
at work is to be simplistic. The fact is that human beings, both on and
off boards of directors, often encounter situations in which they simply
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believe that a certain course of action is the decent course to pursue.
Whether the motivating force is ethics, morals, religion, social con-
sciousness, or innate decency matters little. The point is that it is not
always a profit motive. It is, therefore, both unrealistic and disturbing
for our legal system to require that such action always be defended on
the theory of benefit to the corporation. It would be better to restate
the law of corporate fiduciary responsibilty in terms which take into
full account the social philosophy of our time. The responsibility of
management, as defined by its legal parameters, must include, in addi-
tion to its immediate profit objective, broad authority to act in securing
social benefits.
To forestall the possibility, probably remote, that sudden substantial
altruistic activity would take shareholders unaware and dissipate a
large portion of their investment, it would be prudent to impose a limi-
tation of reasonableness upon the grant of a broad power to engage in
altruistic social activity. A limitation of reasonableness is one familiar
to our judicial system. It would serve the limiting purpose indicated
above, and yet allow for development as our socio-economic philoso-
phy changes. Under this test, the amount of an expenditure can be
weighed against factors such as the assets and income of the donor with
due regard to the social goals sought to be achieved. In this expanded
context, a business jugment test would continue to insulate the courts
from detailed review of most activity, and yet provide a method of
preventing extreme and totally unexpected action.
Aside from the development of the law in particular jurisdictions as
noted in this article, strict pursuit of shareholder interest remains the
legal standard applied to determine the parameters of permissible cor-
porate social activity. At present, it is only to the extent herein indi-
cated that corporate activity not related to profit falls within the bounds
of legality.
A failure to allow the huge concentrations of wealth and power
which are our corporations to use their funds in the pursuit of social
betterment in a pluralistic fashion will only result in a greater concen-
tration of power and wealth in government. Society will insist that its
goals be reached. Our choice is that of pursuing the goals solely
through ever larger bureaucratic government, or, in addition, through
the pluralistic device of the almost unlimited actual and potential imag-
ination of our business community.
We have reached a point in our social consciousness where, despite
the difficulties involved, we must, to honestly reflect reality, embrace a
bold public obligation theory. The creation or recognition of a legal
standard which would honestly permit the use of corporate funds for
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social purposes not related to profit, should not cause concern that this
standard would encourage an abandonment of profit seeking as a ma-
jor or the major corporate purpose. The degree of corporate altruism
will without doubt be responsive to the balance which exists between
our society's desire for profit and social betterment. Management's de-
cisions will continue to be influenced heavily by the profit-seeking
desires of shareholders. Undoubtedly, one of the strongest objectives
of management is to remain in power. But profit is not the only thing
sought by society, as that society is composed of shareholders and man-
agers and others. Management should be allowed to be legally respon-
sive to all of the aims of our society including all of the aims of its
shareholders.
We must recognize, as stated by Justice Worthen in his dissent in
Union Pacofc Railroad Co. v. Trustees, Inc., that corporate expenditures
in the social sphere are not always made in expectation of a quid pro
quo, but that often "the real purpose of these public spirited directors is
their desire to aid worthwhile causes that need their assistance."'
It would be preferable, for the sake of certainty, for the states to
amend their corporation law to grant specifically broad power for cor-
porate expenditures for social benefit, not related to profit, limited only
by a test of reasonableness. Such legislation is, however, not essential
in order to permit such expenditures. As stated by Justice Jacobs of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey:
The genius of our common law has been its capacity for growth
and its adaptability to the needs of the times. Generally courts have
accomplished the desired results indirectly through the molding of
old forms. Occasionally they have done it directly through frank re-
jection of the old and recognition of the new. But whichever path the
common law has taken it has not been found wanting as the proper
tool for the advancement of the general good.65
However it is accomplished, by statute or by the development of the
common law, the legal standard of permitted corporate activity must
include expenditures not related to profit, so as to conform to society's
present expectation of corporate social responsibility.
64. 8 Utah 2d at 112, 329 P.2d at 405 (1958).
65. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 154, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (1953).
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